SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPDSC - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2094 -3 REV: 04/26/88

SEMBLY : AFT PCA-2 CRIT. FUNC: 1R

P/N RI :JANTXIN1204RA CRIT, HDW: 2
P/N VENDOR: VEHICLE 102 103 104
QUANTITY:1 EFFECTIVITY: X X X

:1 EFFECTIVITY: X X X X:ONE PHASE(5): PL X LO X OO DO LS

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-PASS B-PASS C-PASS

PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY (NASA):

EPDC SSM (Sales)

REL F DEFENSOR & REL Man Colon S-688 EPDC REL WILL S-688

QE JE D MASAI QE JE Genson 5-6-88 DEC MWW.

ITEM:

DIODE, BLOCKING (12 AMP), LOZ OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSE SOLENCID (LV76), CLOSE COMMAND B RPC OUTPUT.

FUNCTION:

ISOLATES REDUNDANT MAIN BUS FOWER TO LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSE SOLENOID. LOCATED AT RPC B OUTPUT AHEAD OF CLOSE COMMAND C HDC. 56V76A132A3CR14.

LURE MODE:

HORT TO STRUCTURE (GROUND).

CAUSE(S):

STRUCTURAL FAILURE (MECHANICAL STRESS, VIBRATION), CONTAMINATION, ELECTRICAL STRESS, THERMAL STRESS, PROCESSING ANOMALY.

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY
- (A) SERIES RPC TRIPS. LOSS OF ONE OF TWO POWER PATHS TO LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE CLOSE SOLENOID. DEGRADATION OF REDUNDANCY AGAINST INADVERTENT DEACTUATION OF CLOSE SOLENOID.
- (B,C,D) NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE.

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SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - MAIN PROP. FMEA NO 05-6J -2094 -3 REV: 04/26/88

- (E) CASE I: 1R/2, 1 SUCCESS PATH AFTER FIRST FAILURE. TIME FRAME - PRELAUNCH.
 - 1) DIODE SHORTS TO STRUCTURE (GROUND).
 - 2) PARALLEL POWER PATH FAILS "OFF" (HDC, RPC, DIODE) CAUSING LOZ OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PV19) TO OPEN.

FAILURES WILL RESULT IN CONTINUED BLEED FLOW RESULTING IN LOSS OF LOS OVERBOARD WITH FAILURE OF BLEED DISCONNECT (PD13) TO CLOSE. BLEED DISCONNECT IS NOT CERTIFIED FOR CLOSURE UNDER FLOW CONDITIONS AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A REDUNDANT INHIBIT AGAINST OVERBOARD FLOW. POSSIBLE RUPTURE OF DISCONNECT HOUSING AND/OR DOWNSTREAM BLEED SYSTEM DUE TO WATER HAMMER. RESULTS IN LOSS OF APPROXIMATELY 3000 LBS OF PROPELLANT WHICH IS INSUFFICIENT TO CAUSE PREMATURE SSME SHUTDOWN.

POSSIBLE AFT COMPARTMENT OVERPRESSURIZATION. FIRE/EXPLOSIVE HAZARD BOTH INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR TO THE VEHICLE. NO LCC EXISTS FOR VERIFICATION OF VALVE POSITION PRIOR TO T-0. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

CASE II: 1R/3, 2 SUCCESS PATHS AFTER FIRST FAILURE. TIME FRAME - ASCENT.

- 1) DIODE SHORTS TO STRUCTURE (GROUND).
- 2) PARALLEL POWER PATH FAILS "OFF" (HDC, RPC, DIODE) CAUSING LO2 OVERBOARD BLEED VALVE (PV19) TO OPEN.
- 3) BLEED DISCONNECT (PD13) FAILS TO CLOSE/REMAIN CLOSED.

RESULTS IN LOSS OF APPROXIMATELY 3000 LBS. OF PROPELLANT WHICH IS NOT ENOUGH TO CAUSE PREMATURE SSME SHUTDOWN. POSSIBLE FIRE/EXPLOSION HAZARD IN FLIGHT. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.

DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

- (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE
- (A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE
 REFER TO APPENDIX F, ITEM NO. 2 DIODE, STUD-MOUNT.
- (B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
 COMPLETE ELECTRICAL VERIFICATION V41ABO.200F EVERY FLIGHT.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE
 NO CREW ACTION CAN BE TAKEN.

- (NSERT

INSERT FOR CIL 05-6J-2094-3 EFFECTS SECTION (E)

IF THE LO2 BLEED VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE BEFORE T-0 THE LO2 BLEED DISCONNECT WOULD BE CLOSING WITH AN OXYGEN FLOW OF 4.1 LBS/SEC. THIRTY-TWO PERCENT OF THIS FLOW WILL BE VAPOR. THE LO2 BLEED DISCONNECT IS NOT CERTIFIED FOR CLOSURE UNDER FLOW. HOWEVER, THE CLOSURE IS AT ONE "G" ACCELERATION RATE (T-0 UMBILICAL SEPARATION RATE) WHICH LIMITS THE IMPACT ENERGY ON THE VESPEL SEAL TO A LEVEL WHICH IS BELOW THE LO2/VESPEL IGNITION LEVEL (NOT PREVIOUSLY TESTED WITH THIS CONDITION). THE WATER HAMMER TOWARDS EFFECT GENERATED DURING THIS CLOSURE HAS BEEN CALCULATED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 60 PSIG. SYSTEM PROOF PRESSURE LEVEL IS 286 PSIG.